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WHOSE LAND IS IT ANYWAY? THE TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME
DISPUTE OVER THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
Nina Roca∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei have been attempting to untie the Gordian knot that has arisen over
the Spratly Islands. The Spratly Islands archipelago is a cluster of
approximately 100 islands, islets, cays, reefs, atolls, rocks, shoals, and
banks in the South China Sea.1 They are located between 4º and 11º3’
North Latitude and 109º30’ and 117º50’ East Latitude.2 Including
territorial waters, the Spratly Islands cover approximately 69,500 square
miles.3 The majority of the islands are too small and arid to support
permanent settlements, and none of the islands have any indigenous
inhabitants.4 The islands also have limited fresh water sources and few
significant mainland resources.5 Notwithstanding, the Spratly Islands do
have strategic, political, and economic value.6 The Spratly Islands’ worth
lies in the sea-lanes that run through the islands, which are needed for trade
into East Asia; their extensive fishing waters, which the controlling state
could restrict a state’s access to; and the hydrocarbon,7 oil, and gas deposits,
which are presumed to be under the sea-beds.8
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Manuel Gomez for his guidance; Riya Resheidat for her edits and comments; and Louis
Holzberg for his advice and feedback.
1
See Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute in the South China Sea: Problems,
Policies, and Prospects for Diplomatic Accommodation, in INVESTIGATING BUILDING MEASURES IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 53, 55 (Rajeet K. Singh ed., 1999).
2
Id. at 56.
3
Id.
4
See generally DAVID HANCOX & VICTOR PRESCOTT, MARITIME BRIEFING: A GEOGRAPHICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS AND AN ACCOUNT OF HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEYS AMONGST
THOSE ISLANDS (Clive Schofield ed., vol. 1 no. 6 1995).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Hydrocarbons are organic compounds “found in coal, crude oil, and natural gas.”Hydrocarbon,
BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/hydrocarbon.html (last visited Jan. 6,
2017). They “are used as fuels, solvents, and raw materials” for products including “dyes, pesticides,
and plastics.” Id. They are predominantly used as a combustible fuel source. See Richard M.J.
Renneboog, Uses of Hydrocarbons, SCIENCEIQ.COM, http://www.scienceiq.com/Facts/UsesOfHydr
ocarbons.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
8
See Jill Goldenziel, International Law is the Real Threat to China’s South China Sea Claims,
DIPLOMAT (Nov. 3, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/international-law-is-the-real-threat-to-
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The end of the Cold War brought about the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and its subsequent departure from Cam Ranh Bay; the United
States’ closure of naval bases in the Philippines; and Vietnam’s withdrawal
from Cambodia.9 This created a strategic vacuum in the South China Sea.10
These events also spurred several East Asian countries to evaluate the
strategic and national security implications of sovereignty claims to the
islands in the South China Sea.11 Currently, five states, China, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, claim to be the sovereign
owners of the islands, but this is still an unsettled international dispute.12
Although there are five claimants, China and Vietnam are the only states to
claim title to the entire island group while the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei only claim title to a portion.13 Brunei does not lay claim to any of
the islands, but does claim the area that falls within its exclusive economic
zone (“EEZ”).14 The majority of these claims are overlapping.15
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNLCLOS”), which China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei,
and other states have all ratified, a state is allowed to establish a twelvemile territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ from its border with the ocean.16 If
one of these states were to establish legal sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands, it would be entitled to exclusive rights to explore and exploit the
islands, and the surrounding sea-bed and ocean.17 Furthermore, it would
have the right to control the sea-lanes that run in-between the Spratly
Islands.18 These sea-lanes are used by foreign commercial fishing boats and
are the only way to reach the South Asian ports.19 The state would also

chinas-south-china-sea-claims; Joyner, supra note 1, at 55.
9
See Joyner, supra note 1, at 53.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Ice Cases: Spratly Islands Dispute, INVENTORY OF CONFLICT & ENVIRONMENT (May
1997), http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/Spratly.htm.
13
Id.
14
See Karen Friar, China’s Artificial Islands in Before-and-After Photos, MARKET WATCH (Jan.
4, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-artificial-islands-in-before-and-afterphotos-2015-10-27.
15
See Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-southchina-sea.html?_r=1 (last updated Oct. 27, 2015).
16
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea].
17
Id.
18
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper
of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China
Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), http://fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml.
19
See Joyner, supra note 1, at 57.
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have control of the extensive fishing waters around the island group and
could control which states and private entities have access to these waters.
Moreover, it could extract and utilize the extensive amounts of
hydrocarbons presumed to be under the ocean bed. 20
When a state ratifies UNCLOS, it agrees to settle any disputes arising
from the interpretation or application of UNCLOS through international
arbitration. Depending on the type of dispute and other factors, UCNLOS
gives jurisdiction to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(“ITLS”), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), or an international
tribunal constituted according to Annex VII or Annex VIII of UNCLOS.21
Pursuant to Article 287(3) of UNCLOS, if a state has not expressed a
preference of dispute resolution available under 287(1), then arbitration
under Annex VII is the default means of settlement.22 Also, pursuant to
Article 287(5), if the states involved in the dispute have not agreed to the
same method of dispute settlement, Annex VII will be the default means of
settlement.23 This is provided that the states have not stated any
reservations or optional exceptions per Article 298.24 The Permanent Court
of Arbitration (“PCA”) is an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII of UNCLOS.25 Both the ICJ and the PCA have recently
decided cases that involved interpreting UNCLOS.26 But, one of the
problems that arises with decisions by the ICJ is that they are not
enforceable; compliance is often urged by conscience or morality.27
Although China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are all
signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of 1958,28 China is not likely to honor any
20

Id.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION,
https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26 See generally Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 625 (Dec. 17); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), Special Agreement, 2 R.
Int’l. Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
27
See W. M. Reisman, The Enforceability of International Judgments and Awards, 63 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1, 2 (1969).
28
The Convention’s principal aim is that foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be
discriminated against, and it obliges parties to ensure such awards are recognized and generally capable
of enforcement in its jurisdiction in the same way as domestic awards. An ancillary aim of the
Convention is to require courts of parties to give full effect to arbitration agreements by requiring courts
to deny the parties access to court in contravention of their agreement to refer the matter to an arbitral
tribunal. See UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (“UNCITRAL”),
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL (1958),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf.
21
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decision made by the PCA or the ICJ since it has already challenged and
rejected the jurisdiction of the PCA in the Spratly Islands dispute, and
would likely challenge and reject the jurisdiction of the ICJ if it were to
arise.29
Also, China has previously refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction
and authority of international courts.30 This is evident because it is one of
the few states that have refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ as
compulsory, and it recently denied the jurisdiction of the PCA to adjudicate
the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Although China has historically declined to work through international
courts, it has promoted peaceful negotiations and cooperation to resolve the
dispute between the states involved with the Spratly Islands. China is a
signatory to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, a declaration of conduct signed in 2002 explicitly undertaking “to
resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes [in the South China Sea] by
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through
friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly
concerned.”31 Because of China’s historic refusal to work through
international courts, its recent rejection of the PCA’s jurisdiction, and its
previous willingness to participate in bilateral treaties with the competing
states, the ideal solution for all parties involved in the dispute over the
Spratly Islands would be to negotiate a treaty where they would set aside
the territorial claims and establish a Joint Development Zone Agreement
similar to the Joint Development Zone Agreement established by Nigeria
and Sao Tome and Principe.
This comment will begin by discussing the historic and modern
assertions that each state has made in support of its claims to the islands. It
will also examine the very recent actions of each of the states in the South
China Sea, which are leading to escalated tensions in the area. It will then
examine each state’s claims to the Spratly Islands and analyze the strengths
and weaknesses of each claim in light of previous ICJ and PCA decisions
and provisions of UNCLOS. It will then discuss the structure and content
of the Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Zone
Agreement, and suggest the states disputing control over the Spratly Islands
create a similar agreement.

29

Id.; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18.
China is not the only state to do this. The United States often also refuses to work through
foreign courts because it believes that its court system is better able to resolve disputes.
31
Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea, section 4 (Nov. 4, 2002), http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-ofparties-in-the-south-china-sea-2.
30
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CHINA’S CLAIMS
China’s claims to the Spratly Islands are based on discovery and
occupation, but, unfortunately for China, the names for the islands in the
South China Sea change frequently in Chinese literature, making it difficult
for researchers to track which islands China previously occupied.32 This is
unfortunate for China because it makes it difficult for any court to
substantiate its claims to the Spratly Islands. China affirms that the Spratly
Islands were terra nullius33 prior to their discovery and that they have been
explored, used, and occupied by Chinese fishermen since ancient times.34
In Chinese mythology, the islands in the South China Sea are collectively
described as the “Tongue of the Dragon” and are portrayed as an
inseparable part of China.35 According to China, starting in 111 B.C.E.,
under Emperor Wu Di of the Han Dynasty, it began exploiting the islands
in the South China Sea.36 China claims that during this time the Spratly
Islands were first discovered.37 Furthermore, starting in 1405, Emperor
Cheng Zu of the Ming Dynasty sent an explorer, Cheng Ho, to utilize and
settle the islands in the South China Sea and include them on maps as
Chinese territory.38 This is the first time that the Spratly Islands were
roughly charted.39 However, “ancient records are sparse, incomplete, and
do not provide compelling evidence of routine occupation, effective
administration, or assertion of sovereign control.”40
China also claims to have maps from 1775, 1810, and 1817
demonstrating that it had discovered and occupied the islands in the South
China Sea.41 Ch’en Lun Chiung, a Chinese scholar, also published a book
32
See Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN DEV. &
INT’L L. 61, 62 (1994).
33
Terra nullius “is a Latin term that means land belonging to no one or no man’s land. In
international law, a territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any state, or over which
any prior sovereign has expressly or implicitly relinquished sovereignty is terra nullius. Sovereignty
over territory which is terra nullius can be acquired through occupation. International sea, and celestial
bodies would come under the term terra nullius.” Terra Nullius, USLEGAL, https://defintions.uslegal
.com/t/terra-nullius/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
34
See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62.
35
Id.
36
See S. Yeh, Nansha Situation and International Law, 19 ECON. & L. 27, 29 (1988).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62.
40
Id. at 63.
41
See Teh-Kuang Chang, China’s Claim of Sovereignty Over Spratly and Parcel Islands: A
Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 399, 405 (1991).
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in 1730, which geographically described the Spratly Islands.42 Moreover,
British books from 1923 and French books from 1927 also have recorded
that the Chinese were living on some of the islands in the South China
Sea.43 However, a 1928 Chinese Government Report portrays the
southernmost delimitation of Chinese territory as the Xisha Islands, also
known as the Parcels, and makes no mention of the Spratly Islands.44
In the Sino-French Treaty of 1887, Vietnam was named as a French
protectorate and France laid claims to the territory west of 105°43’ East of
Paris, in effect ceding the territory east of this line to China.45 Because the
Spratly Islands lie east of this line, China cites to this treaty to affirm that
the Spratly Islands were under Chinese ownership.46 However, although
the Spratly Islands do lie east of this line, the Spratly Islands were neither
mentioned nor named in the treaty; the treaty does not include a northern,
southern, or eastern line of demarcation; and respective interpretations of
the treaty in Chinese and French are controversial.47
Since 1914, China has employed and developed what is known today
as the “nine-dash line” in its maps.48 This line is used to delineate its claims
to the South China Sea.49 Although China does claim that it was the first to
discover and occupy the islands, it concedes that in 1930 and 1932 France
began occupying a variety of the islands that China claimed belonged to
China.50 China strongly protested the French government for taking the
islands.51 In 1939, France relinquished their claims to the islands to Japan,
and Japan took over the entire chain of islands in the South China Sea.52
Through this invasion, Japan established the first recorded permanent
garrison and was the first to demonstrate effective sovereign control over
the Spratly Islands.53 By 1945, Japan had surrendered and returned the
islands to China; and, by 1946, China had regained physical possession of
the islands.54
42

See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62.
See Chang, supra note 41, at 406.
44
See Cordner, supra note 32, at 62.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 63.
47
Id. at 65.
48
See generally Jane Perlez, Vietnam’s Law on Contested Islands Draws China’s Ire, N.Y.
TIMES (June 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/world/asia/china-criticizes-vietnam-indispute-over-islands.html.
49
Id.; see also Friar, supra note 14.
50
See Chang, supra note 41, at 406.
51
See Jianming Shen, Chinese Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical
Perspective, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 94, 98 (2002).
52
See Chang, supra note 41, at 406; Shen, supra note 51, at 98.
53
See Cordner, supra note 32, at 64.
54
See Chang, supra note 41, at 406; see also Shen, supra note 51, at 98–99.
43
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China maintains that its claims to the Spratly Islands were further
solidified by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Sino-Japanese
Treaty of 1952 because Japan formally renounced its claims to the Spratly
Islands in both.55 Although Vietnam made claims to the islands at the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, China asserts that these claims are null
because China was not invited to participate in that treaty and because
“Premier Zhou Enlai issued a statement reiterating China’s unquestionable
sovereignty over these islands and warning against any arrangement at the
Conference that might be aimed at challenging or affecting China’s
sovereignty.”56 Also, although Japan did formally renounce its claims to
the Spratly Islands at the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, it did not
name a sovereign successor.57
In the 1950s and 1960s China’s claims to the Spratly Islands were
further challenged. Vietnam began to occupy some of the islands in the
South China Sea and the Philippines declared sovereignty over various
islands, claiming it discovered some of the Spratly Islands.58 Beginning in
the 1960s, Malaysia and Brunei had also begun laying claims to some of the
Spratly Islands by occupying certain islands.59 Tensions in the South China
Sea escalated in 1974 when Vietnam and China had a battle over some of
the islands that Vietnam had claimed.60 This resulted in China reclaiming
some of the islands Vietnam previously occupied.61 Relations were further
strained in 1987 and 1988 when two military encounters occurred between
the Chinese and Vietnamese navies, which caused casualties on both
sides.62 In 1995, China had another military confrontation on the South
China Sea, but this time with the Philippines’ naval forces.63 Since then,
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia have increased their military and
non-military presence in the South China Sea to protect their respective
claims.64
In 2002, China signed an agreement with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) agreeing not to make any provocative moves in
disputed territory.65 This included the agreement that none of the disputing
55

See Chang, supra note 41, at 401.
Shen, supra note 51, at 99.
57
See Cordner, supra note 32, at 64.
58
See Shen, supra note 51, at 100.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Trefor Moss, China Begins Construction in Spratly Islands, WALL STREET J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579561123291666730 (updated May 14,
56
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countries would begin construction on disputed features.66 China violated
this agreement in 2014 when it began construction on Johnson South Reef,
a reef which the Philippines claimed possession of.67 That same year,
China deployed a rig in the South China Sea.68 These actions were seen as
assertive behavior, and therefore provocative moves prohibited by the
agreement with ASEAN, by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei, all of which have their own claims in the South China Sea.69
Recently, China has been building islands in the South China Sea,
further straining the already tense relations with its Asian neighbors.70 It
does this by breaking up sediment from the sea-bed and transporting and
depositing it on top of reefs.71 This has caused the destruction of several
reefs and extensive damage to the surrounding marine life.72 Although
other states have expanded the islands that they claim, the speed and scale
of China’s construction has distressed competing nations.73 As of 2016,
China has constructed “port facilities, military buildings, and an airstrip on
the islands, with recent imagery showing evidence of two more airstrips
under construction.”74 Although the Chinese were not the first to begin
island construction in the Spratly Islands, its island building has been much
quicker than similar efforts in the South China Sea.75
These island installations are intended to bolster China’s claims in the
Spratly Islands.76 The new islands allow China to control and exploit
portions of the sea, exercise more control over fishing in the region, extract
natural resources from the sea-bed, and fortify the Chinese’s territorial
claims. The Spratly Islands also enable continued Chinese air and sea
patrols.77 One of the new islands is strategically significant because it has
an airstrip long enough for planes, fighter jets, and large transport aircrafts
to land.78 These are not the first airstrips in the region; every other country
that occupies islands in the South China Sea operates their own airstrips,

2014, 7:58 AM).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See Watkins, supra note 15.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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but China would be the first to have three airstrips in the area.79 By
preserving the original buildings on the islands, China can assert that it is
only expanding its former facilities, which is what the competing states
have done on the islands that they occupy.
B. VIETNAM’S CLAIMS
Vietnam’s claims to the Spratly Islands are based on discovery and
occupation.80 Official Vietnamese documents assert that its ownership can
be traced to 1650, but these claims are largely unsupported.81 However, in
1816, Emperor Gia-long did claim governance over the islands, and an
inaccurate 1838 Vietnamese map does present the Spratly Islands, named
Van Ly Truong Sa, as Vietnamese territory.82
In the Sino-French Treaty of 1887, the French protectorate declared
Vietnam to be French territory, but the treaty avoids any mention of islands
in the South China Sea.83 When France claimed the Spratly Islands in
1933, Vietnam did not protest the taking.84 And, at the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty, France signed the treaty relinquishing its claims over the
islands with no attempt to reassert its sovereignty over them and with no
reservations to the treaty.85 At this treaty’s conference, Vietnam affirmed
its sovereign control over the Spratly Islands, but this claim was
immediately and strongly challenged by the statement of Premier Zhou
Enlai, despite the fact that China was not represented at the conference
because they were not invited.86 Vietnam argued that since its claim passed
uncontested by conference members, there was universal recognition of its
claim.87
In 1956, when the Philippines first laid claims to the Spratly Islands,
the Republic of South Vietnam protested, which modern-day Vietnam
believes reaffirmed their ownership of the Spratly Islands.88 But, the
government of North Vietnam supported Chinese ownership of the Spratly
Islands.89 By 1973, the Republic of South Vietnam had incorporated eleven

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
See Cordner, supra note 32, at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
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of the islands and occupied five of the islands.90 And, by 1975, upon
Vietnamese reunification, the government reasserted its claims over the
entire island group despite North Vietnam’s previous support of China’s
claims.91 Since then, the “Vietnamese have continued to maintain
precarious garrisons on up to twenty-two features of the Spratlys,
supporting a claim to effective occupation of part of the Spratly archipelago
since 1973.”92
In January 2016, Vietnam formally accused China of violating its
sovereignty because China landed a plane on an airstrip on one of its new
islands.93 This new island lies in an area that both China and Vietnam
claim sovereignty over.94 According to newspaper sources, “Vietnam
reportedly logged 46 such incidents—which the country says endangers air
safety and violates its sovereignty—in just one week.”95 The Foreign
Minister of Vietnam asserted that the airfield was built illegally in
Vietnam’s territory.96 China’s Foreign Minister answered these assertions,
claiming that the flight to the new airfield was completely within China’s
sovereignty.97 In response to this, Vietnam has sent letters of protest to
China and the International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”).98 The
Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam also sent letters to the ICAO, several
other aviation bodies, and more than one hundred international carriers,
asking them to implement measures to prevent China from continuing these
actions and urging them to protest China’s actions.99 Vietnam expects the
ICAO to issue warnings to China because it is responsible for international
civil aviation activities.100
C. THE PHILIPPINES’ CLAIMS
The Philippines’ claim to the majority of the islands in the Spratly

90

Id.
Id. at 65.
92
Id. at 66.
93
See Reuters, Vietnam Protests After China Lands Plane on Disputed Spratly Islands,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2016, 12:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/03/vietnamprotests-after-china-lands-plane-on-disputed-spratly-islands.
94
Id.
95
Sneha Shankar, Vietnam Asks International Aviation Community to Condemn China Over
Spratly Island Flights, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016, 8:09 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/vietnamasks-international-aviation-community-condemn-china-over-spratly-islands-2258169.
96
See Reuters, supra note 93.
97
Id.
98
See Shankar, supra note 95.
99
Id.
100
Id.
91
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Island group stems from the discovery of terra nullius by Tomas Cloma, a
Filipino businessman and lawyer. Cloma claims to have discovered the
islands in 1947.101 And, in 1956, he proclaimed the islands as a new state
named Kalayaan and established himself as the chairman of the Supreme
Council of the new state.102 He established small settlements on these
islands, but remained physically present on them for only a few months.103
Although the Filipino government remained ambiguous about Cloma’s
claims, it did assert that the Kalayaan state was terra nullius and separate
from the Spratly Islands.104
In 1974, the Philippines received ownership of the Kalayaan state from
Cloma.105 In 1978, the Philippines’ President declared that the Kalayaan
state was part of Filipino sovereign territory.106 He also declared a 200nautical mile EEZ extending from the territorial sea baseline.107 Currently,
the Philippines occupies eight islands in the Spratly Islands.108
In 2013, the Philippines took legal action against China and filed a
complaint with the PCA in order to initiate arbitral proceedings against
China for breaching its sovereignty in the South China Sea.109 While China
immediately rejected the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the PCA originally
found that it had jurisdiction over the majority of the claims that the
Philippines brought against China, but did not make a decision about the
rest of the claims the Philippines made until its final Award was issued.110
Most recently, China has demanded all Filipino military forces
withdraw from one of the disputed islands in the Spratly Island group.111
The Foreign Minister of China stated, “We again call on the Philippines to
withdraw their personnel and construction from the islands which the
Filipino side illegally occupied, refrain from actions that harm regional
peace and stability, and do not facilitate Chinese-Filipino relations.”112 This
was in response to peaceful, Filipino student protesters, who were present
101

See Cordner, supra note 32, at 66.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 67.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
See Case No. 2013-19 (Phil. v. China), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility at ¶ 136
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter Case No. 2013-19], https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506.
110
Id. at ¶ 137.
111
See Jess McHugh, South China Sea Dispute 2015: Philippines Should Withdraw Military
From Spratly Islands, Beijing Demands, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:55 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-2015-philippines-should-withdraw-military-spratlyislands-2240811.
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on one of the largest islands in the Spratly Island group for three days,
demonstrating to condemn China’s continuing construction of new islands
and to assert the Philippine’s absolute right to the islands.113
On June 30, 2016, the newly elected Rodrigo Duterte assumed the
presidency of the Philippines.114 President Duterte, described as a
“maverick,” “controversial,” and “an executioner who would bring terror to
the Philippines,” campaigned on very forthright statements about the South
China Sea, including that “he would sail to the disputed islands and plant
the Philippine flag there.”115 As a political outsider and skeptic of the
United States’ involvement, President Duterte has expressed a willingness
to negotiate with China over the disputed islands, which is a very different
approach from the previous administration, which filed for arbitration over
the matter.116 The Philippines will soon be faced with the choice of either
maintaining its alliance with the United States or making deals with China;
a decision which will significantly impact all states currently disputing the
Spratly Islands.
D. MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI’S CLAIMS
Both Malaysia and Brunei’s claims to the southern portion of the
Spratly Islands are based on their geographic proximity to the islands.
Under UNCLOS Article 76, the legal continental shelf is the “submerged
prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, [which] consists of the
sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope, and the rise.”117 UNCLOS does
not reference or have any provision for land that rises above sea level.118
So, under UNCLOS, none of the states contesting ownership of the islands
or the surrounding waters, can claim the continental shelf of cays, islets,
atolls, or other similar above sea level features. Furthermore, under
UNCLOS, the claiming state does not need to demonstrate any form of
control over the continental shelf to prove its ownership.119
Malaysia, in its claims, has invoked UNCLOS; specifically, the
113

Id.
Shirley Escalante, Rodrigo Duterte Officially Declared Philippines Election Winner; Leni
Robredo Wins VP Race, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-28/rodrigo-duterte-officiallydeclared-philippines-election-winner/7455682 (updated May 27, 2016, 8:58 PM).
115
Philippines Election: Maverick Rodrigo Duterte Wins Presidency, BBC NEWS (May 10,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36253612.
116
Wyatt Olson, South China Sea Has Become Flashpoint Between American Status Quo and
Chinese Naval Ambitions, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.stripes.com/news/south-chinasea-has-become-flashpoint-between-american-status-quo-and-chinese-naval-ambitions-1.432079.
117
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16, at art. 76.
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See Cordner, supra note 32, at 67.
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See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16, at art. 77.
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provisions that address the continental shelf and its promulgated
Continental Shelf Act of 1966, which is modeled after the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf.120 Malaysia’s claims coincided with
the publication of the Malaysian Map of 1979, which defined Malaysia’s
continental shelf area.121 Malaysia also claimed an EEZ in 1984, but it has
not yet published an official map outlining the coordinates of these
delimitations or their baselines.122 Malaysia has also “declared sovereign
jurisdiction over all islands and atolls on the prescribed continental shelf on
the theory that the 1958 Geneva Conventions on territorial waters and
continental shelf boundaries and LOSC [UNCLOS] support such an
assertion.”123 But, Malaysia is also asserting a twelve-nautical-mile
territorial sea from Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay, which are above sea
level at high tide.124 Since 1983, Malaysia has stationed troops on three of
the islands that it claims, and it has reportedly built a holiday resort on one
of the islands.125
Brunei, the state with the smallest jurisdictional claim, bases its claims
upon its continental shelf delimitation, which was first established by
Britain in 1954.126 Brunei’s claim stems from UNCLOS’s continental shelf
provisions and the Territorial Waters of Brunei Act from 1982.127 It claims
a “12-mile territorial sea; a 200-mile EEZ; and a continental shelf to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to 200 nautical miles where the
outer edge does not extend up to that distance.”128 Brunei does not claim
territorial sovereignty over any of the disputed islands; rather, its claims are
for maritime jurisdiction throughout its EEZ.129 Essentially, Brunei is only
asking for its complete jurisdiction throughout the EEZ that UNCLOS
guarantees. Because none of the islands lie within this zone, it is not
asserting sovereignty over any of the islands.
In 1980, Britain and Malaysia entered into discussions concerning the
maritime delimitation of their adjacent maritime boundaries.130 This
discussion was continued in 1984, after Brunei’s independence from
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See Cordner, supra note 32, at 66.
Id.
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Id.; see also J. ASHLEY ROACH, MALAYSIA AND BRUNEI: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR CLAIMS IN
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 2 (2014), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IOP-2014-U-008434.pdf.
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See Cordner, supra note 32, at 68; see also DANIEL J. DZUREK, Maritime Briefing: THE
SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: WHO’S ON FIRST 45 (Clive Schofield ed., vol. 2 no. 1, 1996).
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See Cordner, supra note 32, at 67.
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ROACH, supra note 122, at 35.
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See DZUREK, supra note 126, at 45.
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See Cordner, supra note 32, at 67.
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Britain.131 By March of 2009, after many years of bilateral discussions
between Brunei and Malaysia, the leaders of both states signed an Exchange
of Letters.132 The Exchange of Letters included, among other decisions, the
final delimitation of the maritime boundaries and the permanent right of
Malaysians to cross through Brunei’s maritime zones.133 The agreement
over the maritime boundaries also solidified the previously contested
delimitation of the territorial sea, the continental shelf, and the EEZs of
both states.134 But, neither state has publicly announced or published these
maritime boundaries, and Articles 75(2) and 84(2) of UNCLOS require
publication.135
Recently, Malaysia granted Chinese naval ships access to use one of its
ports near the Philippines and the Spratly Islands as a stopover location.136
Analysts claim this was done in an attempt to maintain peace in the South
China Sea and avoid taking sides in the dispute.137 Scholars claim this act is
a gesture of neutrality because that port was already open to the United
States, France, and other states.138 Malaysia has been cautious to confront
China, unlike the Philippines and Vietnam, even in the face of its
disapproval of Chinese naval and coastguard ships entering contested
waters and its fishermen’s resentment of Chinese competitors exploiting the
area.139 A military analyst argues that this action demonstrates China’s
willingness to cooperate with smaller nations in the disputed area, and is
beneficial to Malaysia because stronger relations with China will give it
more confidence when dealing with the Philippines and Vietnam in the
contested region.140 Brunei has been silent with regard to states’ recent
developments in the Spratly Island group.141
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See generally ROACH, supra note 122.
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See ROACH, supra note 122, at 46.
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See ROACH, supra note 122, at 13; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 16, at art. 75(2), 84(2).
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See PLA Navy Gains Use of Port in Malaysia Close to Spratly Islands, SOUTH CHINA
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III. ANALYSIS
Because all five competing states have ratified UNCLOS, they have
implicitly agreed to settle the dispute arising from its interpretation through
international arbitration. UNCLOS gives jurisdiction to the ITLS, the ICJ,
or the PCA, and the ICJ and the PCA have previously decided cases
interpreting UNCLOS.142 Analyzing past cases from these two courts
assists in determining how the courts evaluate and apply the laws and how
they would likely weigh the strengths and weaknesses of each state’s claim
to the Spratly Islands. Per the existing state of the law, none of the states
competing for sovereignty over the Spratly Islands have perfect claims.
And, because of China’s constant refusal to work through international
laws, any decision made by the ICJ or PCA would likely be rejected and
ignored by it. The best decision for all states involved would be to work
through a Joint Development Zone Agreement, similar to the one
established by Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe. The best chance for
this to work would be if China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei worked together in developing this agreement without any
intervention from third party states, like the United States or nongovernmental organizations.
A. INDONESIA V. MALAYSIA
In 2002, the ICJ held, in a sixteen to one decision, that sovereignty
over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands belonged to Malaysia and not to
Indonesia.143 Although decisions by the ICJ are typically made by a panel
of 15 judges, in this particular case, there were two supplemental ad hoc
judges.144 Each party had the opportunity to choose an ad hoc judge to sit
in the case because none of the elected judges were from either party’s
nationality.145
The first issue the court considered was whether there had been valid
treaties that decided whether either state could claim sovereignty over the
islands.146 Claims based on treaty law are normally very persuasive to the
ICJ because treaties are binding on parties that have ratified them, and
because Article 38 of the ICJ Statute requires the court to consider treaties

142

See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 16.
See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 625 (Dec. 17).
144
Id. at ¶ 10.
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Id.
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when making decisions.147
In Indonesia v. Malaysia, Indonesia’s claims to the islands stemmed
from the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands. The
ICJ examined the 1891 Convention, the record of negotiations, the
subsequent conduct of the parties to the 1891 Convention, and the maps
submitted by both states.148 It concluded that the object and purpose of the
1891 Convention was not to determine sovereignty over the islands east of
the line of possession, and therefore did not give Indonesia a title on which
it could claim the Ligitan and Sipadan islands.149
Along with treaty law, the court considered uti possidetis.150 The
doctrine states that uti possidetis prevails over competing claims based on
occupation.151 These types of claims can pose problems, as they did in this
case, because administrative colonial borders are typically drawn
vaguely.152 The ICJ considered whether Indonesia or Malaysia gained title
to Ligitan and Sipadan by succession and rejected both states’ claims to uti
possidetis.153 It rejected Indonesia’s claim that it retained title to the islands
as successor to the Netherlands and also rejected Malaysia’s claim that it
gained sovereignty over the islands from the Sultan of Sulu.154 These
claims were rejected because the documents, which transferred ownership
of the islands between the states, never mentioned the islands; the claiming
states never acted as if the islands were part of their territory; and the maps
and treaties were generally too vague to draw any solid conclusions.155 The
ICJ decided that if there were no valid treaties and uti possidetis did not
apply, the next question would be whether effectivités156 could be applied to
determine which state had the stronger legal basis to its claims.157
A claim based on effectivités, or effective control, is that a state or
group has “uncontested administration of the land and its resident
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See generally id.
Id. at ¶ 17.
149
Id. at ¶ 50.
150
Id. at ¶ 90. “Uti Possidetis is a Latin term which means ‘as you possess.’” Uti Possidetis,
USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/uti-possidetis/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). Uti Possidetis is a
doctrine through which states that recently gained their independence can inherit the pre-independence
administrative boundaries created by their former colonizers.
151
See Bryan Taylor Sumner, Note, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53
DUKE L.J. 1779, 1790 (2004).
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Id. at 1791.
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See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgement, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 625, ¶ 99 (Dec. 17).
154
Id. at ¶ 119.
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Id. at ¶ 122.
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Id. at ¶ 137.
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population.”158 To establish effectivités, states need to prove two elements:
1) the intention and will to act as a sovereign and 2) some actual exercise or
display of such authority.159 The court further stated that “in many cases
the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual
exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make
out a superior claim.”160 It also specifically noted that “in the case of very
small islands which are uninhabited or not permanently inhabited, [like the
Spratly islands] which have been of little economic importance, effectivités
will indeed generally be scarce.”161 The court continued by establishing
that “activities by private persons cannot be seen as effectivités if they do
not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental
authority.”162 It also observed that it could not take into consideration acts
that took place after the date the dispute between the parties was solidified,
unless those acts were a normal continuation of previous acts and were not
done for the purpose of improving the legal position of the party taking the
actions.163 Many scholars consider effectivités the most important factor in
establishing a strong territorial claim.164
The court in Indonesia v. Malaysia analyzed activities that evidenced
an actual, continued exercise of authority over the islands.165 The ICJ
concluded that Malaysia had title to Ligitan and Sipadan on the basis of
effectivités because Malaysia had taken actions including the regulation and
control of turtle eggs from the islands and the creation of a bird reserve on
Sipadan.166
The court considered these actions as regulatory and
administrative assertions of authority over the contested territory and,
although few in number, they spanned a lengthy period of time and
demonstrated an intention to exercise state functions on the two islands.167
Indonesia’s claims failed mostly because it did not demonstrate state action
over the islands, and its claims were severely weakened by an Indonesian
waters act map, which defined its archipelagic baselines, that failed to
include or even mention the Ligitan and Sipadan islands.168 The court did

158

Sumner, supra note 151, at 1787.
See Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgement, 2002
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not make a decision regarding the territorial waters or the maritime
borders.169
B. THE PALMAS CASE
In 1928, the PCA arbitrated a territorial and maritime dispute over the
Island of Palmas between the United States and the Netherlands.170 The
United States and the Netherlands both claimed sovereignty over the
Palmas islands, located between the Philippines and the Dutch East
Islands.171 The United States claimed that Spain originally held sovereign
title to the islands, and then ceded title to the United States through the
Treaty of Paris.172 They also claimed title through contiguity, or
geographical proximity, between the Philippines and the island.173 The
Netherlands claimed sovereignty through their continuous display of
authority over the island.174
The PCA determined that discovery of a piece of land only resulted in
inchoate title and was not sufficient to establish sovereignty.175 Sovereignty
through inchoate title would only be sufficient if it was followed by
effective occupation or a continuous display of authority.176 But, peaceful
and continuous displays of sovereignty, like occupation and presence, could
be as good as having title.177 Because the territorial sovereignty of the
Netherlands on the Island of Palmas went uncontested from 1700 to 1906,
and the Netherlands maintained effective control of the island throughout
these years, its claim was stronger than the United States’ claim through
inchoate title.178
C. INDONESIA V. MALAYSIA STANDARD AND THE PALMAS CASE
STANDARD
Both China and Vietnam have attempted to use treaty law to justify
their claims to the Spratly Islands, but neither of their claims would likely

169
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succeed at the ICJ. The Sino-French Treaty of 1887, like the 1891
Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands, was not written to
determine sovereignty over the islands east of the line of demarcation, but
rather to establish Vietnam as a French protectorate and solidify France’s
claims in the west. The ICJ would likely conclude that the treaty did not
give China title of the Spratly Islands, like the 1891 Convention did not
give Indonesia title of the Ligitian and Sipadan Islands, because the Spratly
Islands are neither mentioned nor named; the north, south, and east lines of
demarcation are not included; and the French and Chinese interpretations of
the Treaty differ. All of these factors indicate that the object and purpose of
the Sino-French Treaty of 1887 was not to determine sovereignty over the
disputed islands. Furthermore, on December 25, 2000, China and Vietnam
both agreed that the Sino-French Treaty of 1887 did not set the maritime
boundaries between them.179 However, they did sign the Agreement on
Fishery Cooperation in the Gulf of Tunkin and the Agreement on Maritime
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tunkin.180
Both China and Vietnam also base part of their claims to the Spratly
Islands on the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, Japan formally renounced all rights, titles, and claims to the Spratly
Islands. France also signed the treaty without reservation, and made no
attempt to reassert its past claims over the islands. The purpose of this
treaty was not to grant title of the Spratly Islands to any state. This is
evidenced through the language of the treaty, which did not name a
successor to the islands. It is also evidenced in that, after Japan
relinquished its claims, both China and Vietnam formally asserted that the
Spratly Islands belonged to them. Since neither of the treaties gave
sovereign control over the islands to any state, the ICJ would not likely
resolve this dispute using treaty law. Furthermore, since the ICJ seems to
be strict in honoring the object and purpose of the treaties it interprets,
neither treaty would likely be found to have conveyed title to either China
or Vietnam.
Vietnam’s claims under uti possidetis would likely be unsuccessful.
Vietnam claims title by French succession because France did occupy some
of the islands in the South China Sea in the early 1930s. However, the
statements made by Gerard Chesnel, the French Consulate in Hong Kong,
effectively nullified these claims.181 On March 22, 1977, he stated that the

179
See Interview by Cheng Jieshe with Jianguo Xiao, Official, Legal Section of China’s Foreign
Ministry (July 28, 2004).
180
Id.
181
See Junwu Pan, Regional Focus & Controversy: Maritime and Territorial Dispute in the
South China Sea: Territorial Dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: A Chinese
Lawyer’s Perspective, JEAIL, Spring 2012, at 213.
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agreement that officially recognized Vietnam’s independence did not
mention the Spratly Islands as Vietnam’s territory.182 Because the ICJ is
very strict in enforcing the object and purpose of the treaties it has to
interpret, the agreement that officially recognized Vietnam’s independence
would not be used to recognize Vietnam’s claims over the Spratly Islands.
In Indonesia v. Malaysia and in the Palmas Case, the ICJ and the PCA
used similar concepts to determine the strengths of a state’s claims. In both
cases, discovery was not sufficient to make a valid claim of sovereignty to a
piece of land. Rather, the ICJ looked to effectivités, and, the PCA looked to
1) territorial sovereignty over the disputed land and 2) maintained effective
control over the disputed land. The state actions necessary to satisfy
effective control under these two separate criteria are very similar.
While China’s claims that the islands were terra nullis prior to its
discovery is valid, the subsequent history of the islands makes China’s
ancient claims to the entire island group unconvincing. First, despite that
China may have discovered the islands, a fact that has yet to be clearly
established, throughout history it failed to maintain effective control of the
islands it occupied. This is evident from the fact that both Japan and France
had control of the islands for a number of years. China has also failed to
show that any of the fishermen, explorers, or cartographers maintained a
presence on the islands on the basis of official regulation or government
authority, as is required by the ICJ. Furthermore, while inchoate title could
be received through discovery, per the PCA, it would only be sufficient if
followed by effective occupation or a continuous display of authority,
which, as mentioned above, China has failed to demonstrate.
Second, China’s ancient claims are insufficient to evince effective
control, under the Indonesia v. Malaysia standard or the Palmas Case
standard, because the Chinese government did not exert uncontested
administration of the Spratly Islands.
Rather, Chinese fishermen
occasionally visited the islands and used the surrounding waters. The acts
of these fisherman cannot be used to establish effective control because
they are not the acts of sovereigns and were not used to display authority or
control. Furthermore, the actions of the explorers and cartographers cannot
be used to establish effective control either. While the cartographers and
explorers who briefly explored the region could be seen as acting under the
direction of China, their actions do not evince effective control since their
presence in the South China Sea was only temporary.
Third, the 1928 Chinese Government Report portrays the southernmost
delimitation of Chinese territory as the Parcel Islands,183 and makes no
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The Parcel Islands lie north of the Spratly Islands. See Watkins, supra note 15.
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mention of the Spratly Islands, which would severely weaken China’s
claims of effective control like the Indonesian waters act map, which
weakened Indonesia’s claim because it failed to include, or even mention,
the Ligitan and Sipadan islands. This would weaken the claim of effective
control because it does not portray China as having the intention to act as
sovereign over the islands since the islands are not even mentioned on its
map. Because effective control cannot be based on activities by private
persons not acting on behalf of the government or official regulation, and
effective control has to be maintained, China would not be able to establish
effective control since ancient times.
Vietnam’s historical claims of effective control are also weak.
Throughout Vietnam’s history, there have been significant gaps in its
control over the Spratly Islands. This is exemplified during the time that
Vietnam was occupied by France, which weakens its claims to the Spratly
Islands since it could not maintain continuous control while it was being
governed by another country. First, France has explicitly denied ceding the
Spratly Islands to Vietnam. Second, although South Vietnam asserted its
claims to the Spratly Islands in 1956 and 1958, North Vietnam expressed its
support of China’s claims, not South Vietnam’s claims. Third, modern day
Vietnam is a successor to North Vietnam; so, North Vietnam’s statements
in support of China’s claims to the Spratly Islands are more binding than
South Vietnam’s 1950s claims, even though in 1975 modern day Vietnam
reasserted South Vietnam’s claims. Because of these significant gaps,
Vietnam did not maintain effective control over the Spratly Islands, and, as
portrayed by North Vietnam’s support of China’s claims, it would not be
seen to have historically had the intention to act as sovereign over the
islands. Vietnam’s historical claims will not likely satisfy the Indonesia v.
Malaysia standard or the Palmas Case standard for effective control.
The Philippines’ historical claims are largely unsupported by
international law. The ICJ in Indonesia v. Malaysia established that
activities by private persons cannot be seen to establish effective control if
they are not initiated by a governmental authority or official regulation.
Even if Cloma claims to have discovered the islands in 1947, his actions
and claims cannot be imputed to the Philippines because he was clearly not
acting with the Philippines’ authority. This is evident because he claimed
the islands for himself and established himself as the chairman of the
Supreme Council of Kalayaan. Furthermore, it was not until 1974, twentyseven years after he allegedly discovered the islands, that the Philippines
claimed to have received ownership from him.
Although none of the states have strong historical claims, their recent
actions over the Spratly Islands are much more indicative of effective
control. However, none of these actions can be used by the states to
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establish effective control because they take place after the date on which
the dispute between the states crystallized. In Indonesia v. Malaysia, the
court found that the dispute crystallized in 1969, the year that the states
asserted conflicting claims to the Ligitan and Sipadan islands. With respect
to finding the date on which the dispute over the Spratly Islands began, it
would be much more difficult to establish a starting date because some of
the claims the states have made are very deeply rooted in historic evidence.
When determining the date that the dispute crystallized, the courts would
likely look at the strong protests the states made when a competing state
claimed sovereignty over the islands. For example, when China strongly
protested the French government for taking the islands in 1932 and during
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty when the Premier of China strongly
challenged Vietnam’s claims to the islands. Courts would also likely look
at the dates the states began occupying the islands. For these reasons, a
court would likely determine that by 1951, Vietnam and China officially
had competing claims to the islands; by 1956, the Philippines had officially
asserted conflicting claims to these islands; and by 1960, Brunei and
Malaysia had announced their claims to the Spratly Islands. Any actions
taken after these dates, unless they were a normal continuation of previous
acts and were not done for the purpose of improving the legal position of
the party taking the actions, would not be used to establish effective control.
The majority of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are
currently occupied by a state. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and
Malaysia are all currently occupying at least a few islands. China’s island
construction in the South China Sea is unprecedented. The construction of
port facilities, military buildings, and airstrips on the islands are
undoubtedly the acts of China as a sovereign state, and it demonstrates
authority and control over the islands that China occupies. The new islands
enable China to maintain effective control not only on the islands it
occupies, but also of the surrounding waters and sea-beds. Furthermore, the
military confrontations between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea
demonstrate both the intention to act as a sovereign over the Spratly Islands
and an actual exercise by the government to establish and maintain
sovereign control over the islands that they claim. However, none of this
would be considered by a court when determining if China has
demonstrated effective control. This is because these actions occurred
significantly after the four other competing states asserted their claims to
the islands, and these actions are not a continuation of the acts of the
Chinese fishermen and cartographers that China used as evidence to bolster
its claims. Furthermore, it is highly likely that a court would see China’s
island building as an attempt to solidify its claims in the South China Sea,
and, as stated in Indonesia v. Malaysia, acts done for the purpose of
improving the legal position of the party taking the actions will not be used
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to establish effective control.
China is not the only state that would have this problem. As of 2015,
Vietnam has also been constructing and expanding the borders of the
islands that it occupies.184 It was the first state to build an airstrip on one of
the islands that it occupies.185 The Philippines has also recently engaged in
island construction and also has an airstrip on one of the islands it occupies.
As of 2016, there were Filipino military forces on a few of the contested
islands. Student protestors were also recently present on one of the islands,
trying to bolster the Philippines claims to the Spratly Islands and condemn
China’s continuous island building. Malaysia also has an airstrip on one of
the islands that it occupies.
A court would not use any of these actions as evidence of effective
control by any of these states because they all occurred after the states
asserted the conflicting claims to the islands. Furthermore, it is highly
likely that a court would see these actions as an attempt to solidify the
states’ claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines specifically runs
against an additional problem since the student protestors on the islands
would not buttress effective control because the students are private
individuals and their acts would not be imputed to the Filipino government.
D. THE PHILIPPINES V. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
In 2013, the Philippines filed a complaint with the PCA to institute
arbitral proceedings against China.186 It invoked Article 287 of UNCLOS
and unilaterally initiated proceedings with the PCA.187 This dispute
concerned China’s claims over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines
in the South China Sea.188 Essentially, the Philippines asked the PCA to
make three findings: 1) that the “nine-dash-line” contradicts UNCLOS and
that UNCLOS should be the only basis for maritime jurisdiction and
sovereignty; 2) that contested maritime formations189 are not entitled to the
adjoining continental shelf or the 200-mile EEZ; and 3) that China’s actions
and behaviors in the South China Sea violate its obligations under
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See Tan Qiuyi, Vietnam Defends Construction in Disputed South China Sea, CHANNEL NEWS
ASIA (May 14, 2015, 8:32 PM).
185
See Airpower in the South China Sea, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (July 29, 2015),
https://amti.csis.org/airstrips-scs/.
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See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109.
187
See Christopher Mirasola, A Shifting Tide in the South China Sea: The Permanent Court of
Arbitration Declares Jurisdiction, HARV. INT’L L.J. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.harvardilj.org/2015/11/
a-shifting-tide-in-the-south-china-sea-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration-declares-jurisdiction/.
188
See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109.
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UNCLOS and interfere with the Philippines’ sovereignty.190 On July 12,
2016, the PCA issued its unanimous and final Award, concluding the
case.191
Although the PCA did find that it had jurisdiction over the dispute as
per the Articles of UNCLOS, China rejected, and has continued to reject,
the authority of the Tribunal and refused to participate in the arbitration.192
China was absent on the day of the hearing on jurisdiction, but it did
publish a position paper outlining its legal claims to the islands and
contesting all the claims made by the Philippines.193 Although China
refused to participate in the proceedings, the PCA used China’s position
paper in its decision-making and cited to the position paper in its Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility and in its final Award.194 In its position
paper, China responded that without first determining which state has
territorial sovereignty over the islands, the PCA cannot determine the extent
of China’s or the Philippines’ maritime claims.195 China also correctly
stressed that tribunals established under Article 287 and Annex VII of
UNCLOS, like the PCA, have no jurisdiction over territorial disputes.196
China expressed that, for the PCA to resolve the maritime dispute, it would
have to also make territorial determinations, which would contravene the
“general principles of international law and international jurisprudence on
the settlement of international maritime disputes.”197 Moreover, China
argued that through the Consultation on the South China Sea and on Other
Areas of Cooperation, issued August 10, 1995; the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, agreed upon in 2002; and the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, all signatory states
agreed to resolve all disputes through negotiations and therefore excluded
any means of third-party settlement.198
Ultimately, on October 29, 2015, the PCA unanimously decided that it
had jurisdiction over seven of the fifteen claims initiated by the
Philippines.199 It reserved judgment on the other eight claims,200 and, in its
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See Mirasola, supra note 187.
See generally Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109.
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See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 18; see
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191

07-NINAFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Whose Land Is It Anyway?

6/3/17 7:23 PM

415

final Award, it unanimously decided that it had complete jurisdiction over
all but two of the claims.201 Because neither China nor the Philippines
opted for a specific type of dispute resolution when they ratified UNCLOS,
the PCA found that the Philippines was justified in initiating proceedings
with the PCA. The PCA also found that China’s refusal to participate
would not hinder the proceedings because “the absence of a party or failure
of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.”202
Although China was not present, the PCA claimed that it implemented
procedural safeguards to protect China’s rights.203
Normally, in
determining whether a state abused process in initiating proceedings, the
PCA will use the standard adopted in Article 294 at a defending state’s
request. This is the “blatant cases of abuse or harassment” standard.
However, the PCA adopted a weaker standard when it determined whether
the Philippines abused process in initiating these proceedings instead of the
more rigorous standard established in Article 294 because China did not
request it.204 The PCA also found that the bilateral and multilateral treaties
and decisions entered into by China and the Philippines did not bar the
PCA’s jurisdiction because these documents did not represent a settlement
between the parties,205 did not exclude other dispute resolution
mechanisms,206 and do not require that the parties indefinitely pursue
unsuccessful negotiations.207
In its final Award, the PCA was cautious to explicitly delimit the scope
of its decision. The Tribunal recognized and honored China’s 2006
declaration to UNCLOS that excluded maritime boundary delimitations
from China’s acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement.208 Because of
this, the Tribunal stated that it would not make any rulings as to maritime
delimitations.209 Furthermore, at the very beginning of the Award, the
Tribunal also stated that it did not purport to make any rulings as to which
state enjoys sovereignty over any land territory.210 It emphasized that none
of the decisions were dependent on findings of sovereignty.211
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Case No. 2013-19, supra note 109, at ¶ 34.
The PCA found that it had jurisdiction over submissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
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With respect to the Philippines’ first claim—that the “nine-dash-line”
contradicts UNCLOS and that UNCLOS should be the only basis for
maritime jurisdiction and sovereignty—the Tribunal found in favor of the
Philippines. The Award concluded that China’s historic claims to the South
China Seas could not survive to the extent that they contradicted the rights
and obligations provided for in UNCLOS.212 The Award continued by
explaining that although China made claims that there were navigators and
fishermen on the islands, there was no evidence of control over the waters
or resources.213 The PCA found no legal basis for China’s historic claims to
the seas within the “nine-dash-line” that would supersede UNCLOS.214
With respect to the Philippines’ second claim—that contested
maritime formations, including reefs, are not entitled to the adjoining
continental shelf or the 200-mile EEZ—the PCA also found in favor of the
Philippines. The PCA scrutinized the language of Article 121 of UNCLOS
when reaching its decision, which states that
1) An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide; 2) Except as
provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance
with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other
land territory; and 3) Rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.215
The PCA explained that in order to determine compliance with Article
121, the Tribunal must examine the objective capacity of a feature in its
natural condition.216 Furthermore, whether a disputed feature is capable of
sustaining human or economic life is decide on a case-by-case basis.217
However, the PCA decided that the presence of people dependent on
outside support, and not reflective of the capacity of the features, would not
be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the rocks sustain human
habitation or economic life.218 The Tribunal looked to China’s historic
claims and found that the alleged presence of fishermen and navigators on
some of the islands was only transient, and therefore insufficient to
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Id. at ¶ 546.
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establish inhabitation.219 Overall, the Tribunal held that none of the
contested features claimed by China were capable of generating an EEZ and
that some of these features were within the Philippines’ EEZ.220
As to the Philippines’ last claim—that China’s actions and behaviors
in the South China Sea violate its obligations under UNCLOS and interfere
with the Philippines’ sovereignty—the PCA also found in favor of the
Philippines.
Overall, the Tribunal found that China violated the
Philippines’ sovereignty in three ways.221 First, the Tribunal found China
was interfering with the Philippines’ fishing and petroleum exploration in
the Philippines’ EEZ.222
Second, China violated the Philippines’
sovereignty by constructing artificial islands in the Philippines’ EEZ.223
Last, the Tribunal believed that China violated the Philippines’ sovereignty
by failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Philippines’
EEZ.224
At a time when the majority of the world’s super-powers are cynical
about the enforcement power of international courts and tribunals, the PCA
acted wisely in issuing a very cautious and limited decision when it granted
its Award. From the very beginning, it expressly stated that it was not
making any decisions as to territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitations.
Furthermore, its decision concerning the “nine-dash-line” only reinforced
the internationally recognized standard that treaty law prevails over all other
claims. Also, the Tribunal’s decision that the contested features could not
generate an EEZ, was narrow in that it did not preclude any state from
claiming sovereignty over the features, only from claiming the extended
twelve-mile EEZ. Even its decision about China’s aggressive island
building in the South China Sea was limited to their island building within
the Philippines’ EEZ. Despite this narrow ruling, China has already stated
that it would not abide by the decision issued by the Tribunal.225 Tensions
have already escalated as, in August 2016, the Chinese Defense Minister
called for preparations for a “people’s war at sea.”226
China saw the Philippines submitting this dispute to the PCA as
aggressive.227 China believed it was a decision that was tactically unwise
and made in bad faith. The Philippines and China both previously agreed to
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the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which
stated that all parties involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands would
engage in peaceful negotiations amongst themselves and not refer the
matter to a third party for dispute resolution.228 Since the Philippines
violated the terms of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea by referring the case to the PCA, China has increased and
strengthened its military presence in the disputed area.229 Also, current
reports show that China has become increasingly aggressive in recent
months in asserting its claim to the Spratly Islands.230 This is evidenced by
their construction of new islands in the South China Sea, which contain
“port facilities, military buildings and an airstrip . . . with recent imagery
showing evidence of two more airstrips under construction.”231 China did
not begin its massive dredging project on the reefs until late 2013, the same
year the Philippines decided to submit its case for arbitration to the PCA.232
These newly built islands are an attempt to solidify its claims to the islands
in the area and will enable the Chinese to continuously patrol the area by
sea and air.233
The decision made by the PCA did not resolve the continuing dispute
over the Spratly Islands. Most importantly, the Philippines and China were
the only two parties to the case at the PCA. The decision not only left the
territorial dispute unresolved as to those two parties, but it ignored the
claims and problems that the other three states have been asserting. The
Spratly Islands dispute is not a dispute that can be resolved by arbitration
between only two of the five parties. Because of the multilateral nature of
this dispute, a bilateral decision by a third party ignores the complexity of
the ongoing situation and leaves the dispute largely unresolved. While
bilateral agreements between states could work to help alleviate the tensions
between China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, one
bilateral agreement will not resolve the problems that have arisen in the
South China Sea. Although the PCA did not make determinations about
which state has territorial rights to which islands, its decision undoubtedly
affected the ever-evolving relationships between China, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia.
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E. UNITED STATES’ INVOLVEMENT
Recently, the United Sates has decided that its presence in the South
China Sea is necessary to combat China’s aggressive actions in the Spratly
Islands. In 2013 and 2014, the United States conducted its Freedom of
Navigation Program exercise against China in the South China Sea.234 The
United States’ Freedom of Navigation Program challenges what the United
States considers to be “excessive claims” to the world’s oceans and
airspace.235 The program was created to promote international compliance
with UNCLOS, even though the United States never ratified the treaty.236
The United States has confirmed that the USS Lassen, a guided-missile
destroyer, has recently breached the twelve-nautical mile zone that China
claims around two of the artificial islands that China occupies.237 However,
the United States contends, “international maritime law allows countries to
claim ownership of the twelve-nautical mile area surrounding natural
islands, but does not allow nations to claim ownership of submerged
features that have been raised by human intervention.”238 So, China would
not be able to assert the twelve-nautical mile area over islands that have
been artificially built by man. While the United States has not officially
endorsed the position of any of the states competing for sovereignty over
the Spratly Islands, it has been very vocal in condemning China for its
recent actions in the South China Sea. Even though all five states have
engaged in islands building, the United States has isolated the Chinese
artificial islands in performing the Freedom of Navigation Program
operation.
The United States claims that its Freedom of Navigation Program was
meant to challenge China’s claims over the islands.239 Lu Kang, a
spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, responded by stating that China
would
resolutely respond to any country’s deliberately
provocative actions. He added that the ship had been
“tracked” and “warned” while on the mission to
deliberately enter the disputed waters. [The United States]
Defense Department spokesman . . . Bill Urban had earlier
said that “the United States is conducting routine operations
in the South China Sea in accordance with international
234
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law.”240
The operation was well received by several Asian countries, including
the Philippines.
The United States involvement in the South China Sea will not help
alleviate tensions between the competing states. Instead, the United States’
provocative actions are increasing tensions in the area and aggravating an
already sensitive situation. From the statements made by Lu Kang, it is
likely that China would respond by matching the United States’ air and
naval procedures and challenging the United States’ actions in the South
China Sea. Also, rather than taunting China, the United States should
withdraw from the ongoing territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands.
First, the United States should not be taking sides in the territorial dispute.
It can continue to express its beliefs on freedom of navigation through the
territorial waters in the South China Sea without specifically condemning
one state’s actions. Second, it is not justified in sending warships and
planes over the South China Sea to strong-arm states into complying with
international laws when the United States itself has not ratified many of the
treaties it is trying to enforce through intimidation. Third, the United States
would be more effective in encouraging the competing states to work
through negotiations and establish creative solutions to the ongoing dispute.
The United States can accent the advantages of treaties, negotiations, and
ongoing peace for all states concerned. This would be much more effective
because aggressive acts by the United States will only encourage aggressive
acts by China. The other four Asian states are more than capable of holding
their own weight against China and resolving this dispute peacefully. The
military and aggressive actions of the United States will only cause more
tension in an already tense area.
F. JOINT DEVELOPMENT ZONE AGREEMENT
Joint Development Zones are governed by UNCLOS Articles 74(3)
and 83(3).241 These provisions allow states to
contemplate provisional arrangements of a particular nature
when they face deadlocks in negotiations over maritime
delimitations. . . . If states cannot agree on their maritime
boundaries, they can or should instead consider cooperation
on the disputed maritime areas, for a transitional period,
240
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while remaining under the duty of carrying negotiations
on.242
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe were previously disputing
territorial and maritime sovereignty over a group of islands off of the coast
of Nigeria.243 Both states claimed to have overlapping claims to the
islands.244 Rather than arbitrating the dispute through an international court
or an international tribunal, the states resolved their dispute by creating a
Joint Development Zone Agreement, which is regulated by a Joint
Development Authority.245
Article 3(1) of that Joint Development Zone Agreement established
three principles of joint development.246 The first principle is joint control
of both parties over the exploration and exploitation of the resources in the
joint development zone (“JDZ”).247 The second principle is optimum
commercial utilization of the resources gathered in the JDZ.248 In the
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Agreement, the
third principle established a sixty-forty percent split of benefits and
obligations in favor of Nigeria.249
Article 3(2) and 3(3) of the Joint Development Zone Agreement also
established three principles that bound Nigeria and Sao Tome and
Principe.250 The first is the due respect to the treaty.251 This principle
established that both parties must abide by the terms of the agreement and
respect the decisions Joint Development Authority with respect to the treaty
and treaty interpretation. The second principle is efficient exploitation of
resources.252 The parties agreed to collectively explore and exploit the
resources from the islands and the surrounding seabed in a way that was
time and cost effective. The third principle is diligent implementation of
the treaty.253 Through this principle, the parties agreed to execute and abide
by the terms established in the treaty.
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The Joint Development Zone Agreement also includes a no prejudice
clause in Article 4.254 Article 4 states that
nothing contained in this Treaty shall be interpreted as a
renunciation of any right or claim relating to the whole or
any part of the Zone by either State Party or as recognition
of the other State Party’s position with regard to any right
or claim to the Zone or any part thereof.255
Also, Article 4.2 states that
no act or activities taking place as a consequence of this
Treaty or its operation, and no law operating in the Zone by
virtue of this treaty, may be relied on as a basis for
asserting, supporting or denying the position of either State
Party with regard to rights or claims over the zone or any
part thereof.256
Through these two articles, both Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe
agree that, by participating in this Joint Development Zone Agreement, they
are not relinquishing or solidifying any claims that they could possibly have
to islands.
The ideal solution for all states involved in the Spratly Islands dispute
would be to set up a Joint Development Zone Agreement much like the one
created by Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe. This would be the best plan
considering that none of the states have very strong claims to the islands
that they are contesting. This would prove to be especially lucrative for
China, which has proved to be unwilling to work through international
courts, as is evident from the facts that it is not a signatory to the ICJ and
has already rejected the authority of the PCA.257
Although China has rejected the involvement of third parties in the
case, China will likely be willing to work directly with the other states
involved in the dispute in the South China Sea. This is evident from its
signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
It would also be in the best interest of all parties involved to work through a
joint development zone agreement because of the weakness of their own
claims and China’s historic refusal to settle situations through the
international courts. They would also likely be willing to work directly
with China and the other states involved as is evident from their signing of
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, China has articulated through its position paper that it “firmly
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believes that the most effective means for settlement of maritime disputes
between China and its neighboring States is that of friendly consultations
and negotiations between the sovereign States directly concerned.”258
The ideal joint development zone agreement between China, Vietnam,
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei would share many of the same
principles as the agreement between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe.
In the agreement between the Asian states, there should be joint control
over the exploration and exploitation of the islands and the surrounding
seabed. All states involved would take part in using the waters for fishing
and excavating the hydrocarbons from the seabed. Moreover, all states
would agree to the optimum commercial utilization of the resources
gathered in the JDZ. Although the Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe
Joint Development Zone Agreement separates the benefits and
responsibilities respectively into sixty and forty per cent shares, this
solution would not be acceptable to the Asian states. This would not work
for the Asian states because a sixty—forty split is not functional between
five states.
The states would also be responsible for establishing a Joint
Development Authority to arbitrate between the states anytime an issue
arises under the agreement that could not be resolved through negotiations.
The Joint Development Authority would be made up of representatives
from each state, and the states would agree to abide by the decisions made
by the authority on matters pertaining to treaty interpretation and
enforcement. While the decisions by the Joint Development Authority
would be no more binding than a decision by the ICJ or the PCA, the states,
particularly China, would likely be more open to abide by its decisions
because the authority would be enforcing a document and agreement that
each state actively participated in making.
Moreover, the Joint
Development Authority would only arbitrate on problems that could not be
resolved through negotiations, and China has been open to negotiations and
consultations with the other state parties involved in the Spratly Island
dispute.
In the case of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei,
the best solution would be to divide the benefits and responsibilities
according to present effective control. Although an international court
would not look to actions that arose after the competing state asserted its
claims, this does not prevent multiple states from doing differently in their
treaties and agreements. For this type of agreement, each state would have
to prove that it did have effective control over the island in question. It
would have to establish this to the approval of the Joint Development Zone
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Authority and meet the standard established in Indonesia v. Malaysia and
the Palmas Case. This should not be a difficult standard for any of the
states because the majority of the islands are occupied and, in recent years,
states have been working to solidify their legal claims in the South China
Sea through island building and militarization. However, it would be
crucial to establish that, similar to the object and purpose of Article 4 and
4.2 of the Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development
Agreement, any decision as to effective control made by the Joint
Development Agreement would not establish effective control for other
purposes and would not be used to bolster any states claim in a matter
outside of the Joint Development Agreement.
Each state would be responsible for excavation of the resources of the
islands over which they currently have effective control. They would
individually benefit from whatever they could collect from these islands
and the surrounding seabed. With respect to the islands that no state has
effective control over, the competing states would enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements with the states that lay claims to the islands, to
resolve, between the competing states, how to divide the work and profits.
These bilateral and multilateral agreements would be overseen by the Joint
Development Authority and arbitrated by it should negotiations not resolve
the problem.
The states that occupy islands would also have the right to the twelvenautical mile zone from the occupied island, but would have to agree to
leave the southern portion of the South China Sea open for all states to
freely navigate. This is crucial to help prevent third party states, like the
United States, from becoming involved in the Spratly Island dispute. The
United States has been vocal through the press and its Freedom of
Navigation Exercises that its presence throughout the Spratly Islands is to
ensure that China does not prevent states from navigating through these
waters. This sea is of particular importance to third party states because it
is rich in fishing lanes and necessary for trade with many East Asian states.
If any state were to close off this area from the presence of foreign ships,
these foreign ships and their respective states and businesses, would not
have an outlet or means of reaching many of the East Asian ports for trade.
Because of the high value of trade, and the desire to keep third parties
uninvolved in this dispute, it is necessary for the five competing states to
leave this area open to foreign ships and stress their commitment to
freedom of navigation throughout the Spratly Islands. For this to work, the
states would also have to demilitarize whatever islands they are occupying.
Having the islands militarized only serves to escalate tensions between the
competing states and third party states, and would cause unnecessary stress
to whatever peaceful negotiations and plans the states would have.
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The Asian states would likely be open to this type of agreement, as is
evident from their past attempts to work through bilateral and multilateral
agreements. In the past, China has entered into numerous bilateral treaties
with the states involved in the dispute. It has also entered into multilateral
conventions with other Asian states. Also, the states have previously
expressed their desires to work with each other and go through third parties
to resolve the ongoing dispute in the Spratly Islands. Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei will likely also be open to working
through bilateral treaties because they will be able to negotiate agreements
that best serve their interests, and the other disputing states will likely honor
these agreements.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Spratly Islands are generally too small and arid to support
permanent settlements, have limited fresh water sources, and few
significant mainland resources, their value to China, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei lies in their strategic, political, and
economic worth. Throughout history these five states have been laying
claims to this group of islands with varying levels of success. The claims
range from discovery, occupation, and uti possidetis, to claims based on
proximity and UNCLOS.
Although the claims made by the states are many, their legal
justifications are few. In light of the decision of the ICJ in Indonesia v.
Malaysia, and of the decision by the PCA in the Palmas Case, none of the
states have taken the requisite actions necessary to establish sovereignty
over the Spratly Islands. The actions of the states do not evince the
necessary intention to act as sovereign; display and exercise of authority
over the disputed area; or maintained control, which is needed to prove
effective control. Moreover, the claims that arise from UNCLOS stem from
a misreading of the convention and are therefore insufficient to establish
sovereignty.
In recent years, tensions in the South China Sea have escalated
drastically. China’s unprecedented island building has been a cause for
concern for the competing states, and the United States’ Freedom of
Navigation exercises have been a cause of concern for the Chinese
government. Also, the increased militarization of the area by the states
involved in the dispute is a major concern. Because of the escalating
tensions, it is of the utmost importance that the Spratly Islands dispute be
resolved as quickly as possible.
Because of the flawed claims by the states, and China’s historic refusal
to work through international courts, the best and quickest resolution would
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be to establish a Joint Development Zone Agreement between the five
competing states. This would work to help ease the tensions between
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei because it would
encourage peaceful negotiations and shared responsibilities to explore and
exploit the resources in the South China Sea.
The ongoing territorial and maritime dispute over the Spratly Islands is
an example of the shortcomings of the international court system. Even
though all these states have competing claims to the islands, under the
existing law, none of their claims would be sufficient to establish
sovereignty. This has led to the militarization of the area and rising
tensions that the courts are currently incapable of solving. Even though the
courts will not resolve this dispute, the Joint Development Zone Agreement
between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe exemplifies the power of
peaceful negotiations. In that case, the answer to the problems that arose
from overlapping claims came from bilateral, peaceful negotiations and the
direct involvement of the competing parties without the intervention of
third party states or organizations. Similarly, the answer to the problem in
the Spratly Islands will only arise from the five competing states working
together without third party intervention. China, a global economic and
military force, has seen the benefits of these types of negotiations. It has
encouraged peaceful discussions and condemned third party involvement in
an effort to resolve the historical dispute; an approach that would be
beneficial for any states currently involved in maritime or territorial
disputes. Although China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei
have been unable to resolve the on-going problems in the South China Sea,
peaceful and continuous negotiations would be the ideal solution to cut the
Gordian knot that has arisen over the Spratly Islands.

